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Novak: Who's Guiding South Carolina's Securities Jurisprudence?: A Major
WHO'S GUIDING SOUTH CAROLINA'S SECURITIES JURISPRUDENCE?:
A MAJOR OPPORTUNITY TO REAPPROACH
SOUTH CAROLINA SECURITIES LAW

I.

INTRODUCTION

In Majors v. South Carolina Securities Commission,1 the South Carolina
Supreme Court addressed a novel question of law by interpreting the meaning of
the term "investment contract" within the definition of "security" under the
South Carolina Uniform Securities Act (SCUSA). 2 In doing so, the Majors court
aligned the statutory definition of investment contract with a strong precedent in
South Carolina securities law: South Carolina courts will look to federal
precedent for guidance in interpreting South Carolina code provisions similar to
those in the federal securities statute. 3 Interestingly, the Majors court
simultaneously distanced South Carolina's securities jurisprudence from this
precedent by looking to the South Carolina Reporter's Official Comments to the
South Carolina Uniform Securities Act of 2005 (SCUSA of 2005) 4 to interpret
the term in accordance with the South Carolina General
Assembly's intentions in
5
enacting the recently revised definition of security.
The Supreme Court's consideration of the General Assembly's purposes in
enacting the statutory term marks an important shift in South Carolina securities
law. Prior to the Majors decision, South Carolina courts applied the terms of
South Carolina's securities statutes almost exclusively by seeking guidance from
federal interpretations of similarly worded provisions in the federal securities
statutes. 6 Federal court interpretations, however, can vary widely by circuit.7 As

1. 373 S.C. 153, 644 S.E.2d 710 (2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 441 (2007).
2.
Id. at 159, 162-63, 644 S.E.2d at 713, 715-16 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 35-1-20(12)
(1987), repealed by South Carolina Uniform Securities Act of 2005, S.C. CODE ANN. § 35-1102(29) (Supp. 2008)).
3.
Id. at 163, 644 S.E.2d at 715 (citing Garrett v. Snedigar, 293 S.C. 176, 180, 359 S.E.2d
283, 285 (Ct. App. 1987), overruled on other grounds by Olson v. Faculty House of Carolina, Inc.,
354 S.C. 161, 168, 580 S.E.2d 440,444 (2003)).
4.
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 35-1-101 to -703 (Supp. 2008) (replacing S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 35-110 to -1590 (1987)).
5.
Majors, 373 S.C. at 165-66, 644 S.E.2d at 717.
6.
See, e.g., Faircloth v. Jackie Fine Arts, Inc., 682 F. Supp. 837, 843 (D.S.C. 1988) (citing
Garrett,293 S.C. at 180, 359 S.E.2d at 285; McGaha v. Mosley, 283 S.C. 268, 273, 322 S.E.2d 461,
464 (Ct. App. 1984)) ("South Carolina courts have yet to perceive any significant difference
between the federal and state definitions of 'security."'), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other
grounds sub nom Faircloth v. Finesod, 938 F.2d 513, 519 (4th Cir. 1991); S.C. Nat'l Bank v.
Darmstadter, 622 F. Supp. 226, 229 (D.S.C. 1985) ("Where the South Carolina securities law is
substantially identical to the federal provisions, South Carolina courts will ordinarily follow the
federal court's interpretations of federal securities laws." (citing Bradley v. Hullander, 272 S.C. 6,
21, 249 S.E.2d 486, 494 (1978))); Biales v. Young, 315 S.C. 166, 169, 432 S.E.2d 482, 484 (1993)
(citing Bradley, 272 S.C. at 21, 249 S.E.2d at 494; Allen v. Columbia Fin. Mgmt., Ltd., 297 S.C.
481, 486-87, 377 S.E.2d 352, 355-56 (Ct. App. 1988)) (applying federal precedent to interpret
"seller" under the South Carolina securities statute).
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a result, South Carolina courts have traditionally employed an unpredictable
approach to applying the state securities statute. Moreover, by relying on federal
interpretations of similarly worded federal provisions, South Carolina courts
9
have traditionally served federal, instead of state, regulatory goals and policies.
In Majors, however, the South Carolina Supreme Court signaled that the
recent enactment of the SCUSA of 2005 presents the opportunity to realign the
application of state securities laws with the General Assembly's purposes in
enacting the provisions of the new securities statute, particularly those provisions
that incorporate nonfederal language. 10 South Carolina's judiciary should
embrace this new approach and continue to establish an independent canon of
state securities jurisprudence that reflects the intentions of the General
Assembly.
This Comment considers the impact of the Majors decision on South
Carolina securities law by examining the Majors court's construction of the term
investment contract,11 South Carolina's traditional approach to interpreting the
state securities statute, 12 and the revised definition of security under the SCUSA
of 2005.13 Part II explores the Majors decision and its place in South Carolina's
securities jurisprudence. Part 1I examines South Carolina's traditional judicial
construction of security and its relationship to federal law. Part IV addresses the
passage of the SCUSA of 2005 and the opportunity to reapproach South Carolina
securities law.
II. MAJORS V. SOUTH CAROLINA SECURITIES COMMISSION

In Majors, the South Carolina Supreme Court considered, inter alia,whether
the South Carolina Securities
ordered a company to
. .... Commissioner properly
14
cease and desist selling unregistered securities. In affirming a circuit court
decision, the Majors court determined that the offering and sale of tax lien
certificates through a particular investment program were securities because the

7.
See 2 LOuiS Loss ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION 856, 858 n.6 (4th ed. 2007)
(suggesting that policy determinations vary the definition of security among jurisdictions).
8.
See, e.g., Allen, 297 S.C. at 486-88, 377 S.E.2d at 355-57 (adopting a federal test for
"seller" under the state securities statute while independently construing "employee").
9.
See, e.g., Martin C. McWilliams, Jr., Thoughts on Borrowing Federal Securities
Jurisprudence Under the Uniform Securities Act, 38 S.C. L. REV. 243, 245-46 (1987) (arguing that
local values and interests must accompany statutory borrowing by state courts).
10. See Majors, 373 S.C. at 165-66, 644 S.E.2d at 717 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 35-1-102
official cmt. 28 (Supp. 2008)).
11. See id. at 162-67,644 S.E.2d at 715-18.
12. See, e.g., S.C. Nat'l Bank v. Darmstadter, 622 F. Supp. 226, 229 (D.S.C. 1985) ("Where
the South Carolina securities law is substantially identical to the federal provisions, South Carolina
courts will ordinarily follow the federal court's interpretations of federal securities laws." (citing
Bradley v. Hullander, 272 S.C. 6, 21, 249 S.E.2d 486, 494 (1978))).
13. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 35-1-102(29) (Supp. 2008).
14. Majors, 373 S.C. at 159, 644 S.E.2d at 713.
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transactions satisfied the federal definition of investment contract and thus
constituted securities under state law. 15
The promoter, Tax Lien Agents, Inc. (TLA), offered for sale investment
opportunities in tax lien certificates (TLC). 16 Local governments generally issue
these certificates at public auction after a property owner defaults in the payment
of property taxes. 7 The certificates usually bear an interest rate of between 8%
and 25%, mature after a period of one to three years, and are secured by real
property for which property taxes have not been paid. 18 A TLC may yield a
much larger return than the guaranteed rate of interest because the real property
is often worth much more than the actual cost of the tax lien certificate, which is
typically the amount of the property taxes owed. 19
A delinquent party, or other real party of interest, may redeem the certificate
by paying the delinquent property taxes plus any accrued interest before the
certificate's maturity date, in which case the government will recall the
certificate and reimburse the certificate purchaser for the cost of the certificate
and the accrued interest. 20 If the delinquent party does not settle the tax lien
before the certificate matures, the government will recall the certificate and issue
to the certificate purchaser a tax deed for the real property securing the
certificate. 21 The purchaser can then quiet title and take possession of the
property.22
In 1998, Ned Majors founded TLA as a solely-owned South Carolina
corporation employing agents to attend government delinquent ad valorem real
property tax lien auctions around the country. 23 At those auctions the agents,
acting on behalf of the corporation's customers, sought to purchase government
TLCs that delinquent parties were unlikely to redeem. An agent represented
only one principal for each certificate purchase but often represented as many as
twenty principals at each auction. Upon a successful bid, an agent paid for the
certificate with a check issued by an individual customer who had previously
drawn the check to the "County Treasurer for Tax Liens. ' 26 After the purchase,
the agent received a government-issued, interest-bearing TLC in 27the principal's
name and recorded the certificate in the appropriate public record.

15. Id. at 163-64, 644 S.E.2d at716.
16. See id. at 156-57, 644 S.E.2d at 712-13 (describing TLA's business model).
17. Final Brief of Primary Appellant, Tax Lien Agents, Inc. at 5,Majors, 373 S.C. 153, 644
S.E.2d 710 (No.04-CP-26 -874).
18. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4-5, Majors, 128 S.Ct. 441 (2007) (No. 07-234).
19. Id.at 5.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See Majors v.S.C. Sec. Comm'n, 373 S.C. 153, 156, 644 S.E.2d 710,712 (2007), cert.
denied, 128 S.Ct. 441 (2007).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 157, 644 S.E.2d at 712.
26. Id.
27. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4,Majors, 128 S. Ct. 441 (2007) (No. 07-234).
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The principals paid a "non-refundable agency fee" for each certificate
purchased, which TLA determined as a percentage of the tax lien purchase
price. 28 The principals also granted TLA a 50% ownership interest in the net
profit of the certificate and any resultant deed. 29 Although the principals were
responsible for quieting title and closing on the property and had the right to
select closing attorneys, the principals rarely exercised this right.30 Instead,
customers generally
retained TLA's services to finalize their transactions for an
31
additional fee.
In South Carolina, the attorney general is, by statute, the securities and
exchange commissioner (Commissioner). 32 In 2003, the Commissioner "entered
an order for Majors and TLA to 'Cease and Desist Selling Unregistered
Securities and Engaging in Securities Fraud' and gave them notice of the right to
a hearing." 33 After the hearing, the administrative hearing officer determined that
TLA and Majors were engaged in the sale of securities because their agency
contract constituted an investment contract. 34 Acting upon the administrative
hearing officer's recommendation, "the Commissioner issued a Final Order to
Cease and Desist Selling Unregistered Securities." 35 Majors and TLA appealed
the order to the circuit court, which found
that the investment opportunity
36
included the offering and sale of securities.
The South Carolina Supreme Court certified the case from the court of
appeals to address several questions, including whether the attorney general
properly ordered the appellants to cease and desist the sale of unregistered
securities. 37 The Supreme Court held, inter alia, that the Commissioner properly
issued the final cease and desist order because TLA's sale of TLCs constituted
the sale of securities within the meaning of SCUSA.38
The South Carolina Supreme Court predicated its approach upon several
propositions: (1) South Carolina courts generally look for guidance to federal
interpretations of the federal securities statutes when interpreting similarly
worded provisions of SCUSA;39 (2) SCUSA and the federal acts each define the
word security to include an investment contract; 4 0 and (3) the Fourth Circuit
employs the Howey test to determine whether an investment instrument qualifies

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
283, 285
354 S.C.
40.

Majors, 373 S.C. at 156-57, 644 S.E.2d at 712.
Id.
Id. at 157, 644 S.E.2d at 712.
Id.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 35-1-102(28) (Supp. 2008).
Majors, 373 S.C. at 157-58, 644 S.E.2d at 713.
Id. at 158, 644 S.E.2d at 713.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 156, 158-59, 644 S.E.2d at 712, 713 (citing S.C. APP. CT. R. 204(b)).
Id. at 163-64, 644 S.E.2d at 716.
Id. at 163, 644 S.E.2d at 715 (citing Garrett v. Snedigar, 293 S.C. 176, 180, 359 S.E.2d
(Ct. App. 1987), overruled on other grounds by Olson v. Faculty House of Carolina, Inc.,
161, 168, 580 S.E.2d 440,444 (2003)).
Id. (citing Garrett,293 S.C. at 180, 359 S.E.2d at 285).
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as an investment contract under federal law. 41 Accordingly, the Majors court
derived a variation of the Howey test's framework from the Fourth Circuit,
applied each element of that test using federal precedents from numerous
jurisdictions, and determined that TLA's sale of TLCs constituted the sale of
securities under SCUSA.4 2
The Howey test is derived from the seminal case of SEC v. W.J. Howey
44
Co.,43 and is generally followed by federal and state courts.
According to the
[
Majors court, " u]nder the Howey test, an investment contract exists where there
has been (i) an investment of money, (ii) in a common enterprise, (iii) with an
expectation of profits garnered solely from the efforts of others. ' 45 In applying a
derivation of the Howey test, the Majors court relied
on the South Carolina Court
46
of Appeals's prior application of the Howey test.
The court of appeals's prior analysis of the definition of an investment
contract focused on the Howey test's third element-the requirement that there
be an expectation of profits from the efforts of others-having presumed that the
other two requirements were satisfied. 47 The Majors court, therefore, sought
guidance from other sources, including the recently passed the SCUSA of 2005
and several federal court decisions, before applying the Howey test's first two
prongs. 48 As a result, the Majors court adopted a fragmented version
of the
49
Howey test that relies upon cases from a number of federal circuits.

41. See id. at 163, 644 S.E.2d at 716. Although the Majors court references the South
Carolina Court of Appeals's recognition of the similarity between "our Act and the Federal Act," id.
at 163, 644 S.E.2d at 715, the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 each
govern the federal definition of security, see Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2006);
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (2006); 2 LOSS ET AL., supra note 7, at
855-57. The definitions of security within those statutes, however, are "treated as identical." 2 Loss
ET AL., supra note 7, at 857 (citing Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 686 n.1 (1985)).
42. Majors, 373 S.C. at 163-68, 644 S.E.2d at 716-18.
43. 328 U.S. 293 (1946); see discussion infra Part III.B.
44. 2 LOSS ET AL., supra note 7, at 922-23.
45. Majors, 373 S.C. at 163, 644 S.E.2d at 716.
46. Id. at 163, 644 S.E.2d at 715-16 (citing SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99
(1946); Garrett,293 S.C. at 180, 359 S.E.2d at 285).
47. See Garrett,293 S.C. at 180-82, 359 S.E.2d at 285-86.
48. See Majors, 373 S.C. at 164-66, 644 S.E.2d at 716-17 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 35-1102 official cmt. 28 (Supp. 2008); SEC v. SG Ltd., 265 F.3d 42, 49-50 (1st Cir. 2001); Long v.
Shultz Cattle Co., 881 F.2d 129, 140-41 (5th Cir. 1989); Brodt v. Bache & Co., 595 F.2d 459, 460
(9th Cir. 1978); SEC v. TLC Invs. & Trade Co., 179 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1156 (C.D. Cal. 2001); Top
of Iowa Coop. v. Schewe, 6 F. Supp. 2d 843, 852 (N.D. Iowa 1998); SEC v. Pinckney, 923 F. Supp.
76, 80 (E.D.N.C. 1996)).
49. See id. (citing § 35-1-102 official cmt. 28; SG Ltd., 265 F.3d at 49-50; Long, 881 F.2d at
140-41; Brodt, 595 F.2d at 460; TLCInvs., 179 F. Supp. 2d at 1156; Schewe, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 852;
Pinckney, 923 F. Supp. at 80).
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An Investment of Money

The Majors court first addressed whether an "investment of money"
existed.50 In doing so, the court turned for guidance to the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina. 51 In SEC v. Pinckney, the
district court held that an investor must place financial assets at risk to make an
investment of money. 52 Although the promoter in Pinckney promised "no risk"
and the invested funds remained under the investor's "sole control" and were
"guaranteed," the district court concluded that the investment program required
an investment of money because investors could have realized a financial loss
through use of a required
power of attorney or by virtue of any "trades" made
53
with the invested funds.
The South Carolina Supreme Court concluded that the arrangement in
Majors satisfied the Pinckney formulation because each customer paid numerous
fees and expenses to TLA in order to participate in the program. 4 The Majors
court also found that participants could suffer a financial loss because TLA's
contract warned of "potential downside financial risk., 55 Accordingly, the
Majors court found that TLA's program required an investment of money.
B. A Common Enterprise
The Majors court then examined the second element of the Howey testwhether the investment program constituted a common enterprise. 57 The court
recognized that other jurisdictions have struggled to discern whether a common
enterprise requires vertical or horizontal commonality, or both.58 The court
explained that vertical commonality requires only a pooling of interests between
the "promoter and each individual investor," while horizontal commonality also
requires "a pooling of interests among the investors." 59 The court further
recognized two types of vertical commonality: broad vertical commonality and
strict vertical commonality. 6° The court explained that under broad vertical
commonality "the fortunes of the investors need be linked only to the efforts of

50. Id. at 164, 644 S.E.2d at 716.
51. Id. (citing Pinckney, 923 F. Supp. at 80).
52. Pinckney, 923 F. Supp. at 80 (citing Hector v. Wiens, 533 F.2d 429, 432 (9th Cir. 1976)).
53. Id. at78-79, 81.
54. Majors, 373 S.C. at 164, 644 S.E.2d at 716.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 164-66, 644 S.E.2d at 716-17.
58. Id. at 164, 644 S.E.2d at 716 (citing SEC v. SG Ltd., 265 F.3d 42, 49-50 (1st Cir. 2001);
Top of Iowa Coop. v. Schewe, 6 F. Supp. 2d 843, 852 (N.D. Iowa 1998); SEC v. Pinckney, 923 F.
Supp. 76, 81 (E.D.N.C. 1996)).
59. Id. at 165, 644 S.E.2d at 716 (citing Schewe, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 852).
60. Id., 644 S.E.2d at717.
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the promoter, ' 61 but under strict vertical commonality
"the fortunes of investors
62
[must] be tied to the fortunes of the promoter."
In its analysis of commonality, the Majors court compared lines of precedent
from several federal jurisdictions, including the First, Fifth, Seventh and Ninth
Circuits. 63 The court also recognized that there are unsettled issues regarding
application of the various interpretations. 64 After assessing each issue, the
Majors court sought to determine the intent of the South Carolina General
Assembly from the South Carolina Reporter's Official Comments to the SCUSA
of 2005, 65 which had recently replaced SCUSA. Those comments state that the
statute "adopts a more restrictive form of vertical commonality that occurs only
when there is profit sharing between [any] two persons. ' 66 Although the new
version of the statute did not apply in Majors because the subject events predated
the effective date of the legislation, the court, taking the view that the Official
Comments reflected the will of the General Assembly, accorded its decision with
those comments by adopting a strict vertical commonality
of profit standard for
67
the common enterprise element of the Howey test.
The appellants contended that the Commissioner's finding of a common
enterprise was inappropriate even under a strict vertical commonality test, but
the court rejected their challene by applying reasoning derived from another
federal district court decision. In SEC v. TLC Investments & Trade Co., a
federal district court in California held that a common enterprise exists where the
promoter's gain is "contingent" upon the investor's gain. 69 Accordingly, the
Majors court concluded that there need not be a showing that the investor's
profits are "dependent" upon the promoter's profits,
only that the promoter's
70
profits are "contingent" on the investor's profits.
C. An Expectation of Profits GarneredSolely from the Efforts of Others
The South Carolina Supreme Court, like the South Carolina Court of
Appeals, disregarded the requirement that an expectation of profits come solely

61. Id. (citing Long v. Shultz Cattle Co., 881 F.2d 129, 140-41 (5th Cir. 1989)).
62. Id. (citing Brodt v. Bache & Co., 595 F.2d 459,461 (9th Cir. 1978)).
63. Id. at 164-65, 644 S.E.2d at 716-17 (citing SG Ltd., 265 F.3d at 49-50; SEC v. R.G.
Reynolds Enters., 952 F.2d 1125, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 1991); Long, 881 F.2d at 140-41; Brodt, 595
F.2d at 461; Schewe, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 852).
64. Id. at 164, 644 S.E.2d at 716 (citing Schewe, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 852).
65. Id. at 165-66, 644 S.E.2d at 717 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 35-1-102 official cmt. 28
(Supp. 2008)).
66. Id. at 166, 644 S.E.2d at 717 (quoting § 35-1-102 official cmt. 28).
67. Id.
68. Id. (citing SEC v. TLC Invs. & Trust Co., 179 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1156 (C.D. Cal. 2001)).
69. TLCInvs., 179 F. Supp. 2d at 1156 (citing SEC v. R.G. Reynolds Enters., Inc., 952 F.2d
1125, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 2001)).
70. Majors, 373 S.C. at 166, 644 S.E.2d at 717 (citing TLC Invs., 179 F. Supp. 2d at 1156).
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from the efforts of the promoter or a third party. 71 In Garrett v. Snedigar, the
South Carolina Court of Appeals looked to federal precedents for guidance
before concluding
that
hr "
72 partnership interests are not securities as a matter of
South Carolina law. In Garrett, several sophisticated parties entered into a
partnership to develop a shopping complex. Although the arrangement was
structured and marketed as a general partnership, the enterprise shared many
characteristics of a limited partnership.74 The Garrett court recognized that
courts generally find limited partnership interests to be investment contracts
because the partners are typically passive investors, but that courts usually do not
find interests in general partnerships to be securities. 75 In accordance with a
federal precedent, the Garrett court concluded that "form should
be disregarded
76
for substance and the emphasis should be on economic reality."
After looking to Garrett and to the Eleventh Circuit for guidance, the Majors
court found the key determination to be "whether the promoters' efforts, not
th[ose] of the investors, form the 'essential managerial efforts which affect the
failure or success of the enterprise.' ''77 The Majors court found that TLA's
investment offering satisfied the Howey test's third element because, "in
practice," investor control was very limited, even though some contractual rights
of control existed.78 Accordingly, the South Carolina Supreme Court found that
TLA's sale of TLCs satisfied the Howey test.79 As a result, the court affirmed the
determination that TLA's investment program constituted the sale of investment
contracts and, therefore, held that the Commissioner properly
ordered TLA and
8
Majors to cease and desist selling absent proper registration. 0

71. Id. at 167, 644 S.E.2d at 717 ("Later cases have eliminated the requirement that one must
expect profits solely from the efforts of others in order for an interest to be a security." (quoting
Garrett v. Snedigar, 293 S.C. 176, 180, 359 S.E.2d 283, 285 (Ct. App. 1987))).
72. Garrett, 293 S.C. at 180-82, 359 S.E.2d at 285-86 (citing Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389
U.S. 332, 336 (1967); SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946); Odom v. Slavik, 703
F.2d 212, 214-15 (6th Cir. 1983); Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 424 (5th Cir. 1981);
Bradley v. Hullander, 272 S.C. 6, 21, 249 S.E.2d 486, 494 (1978); Hugh L. Sowards, Federal
SecuritiesAct of 1933, in [11 -Part 1] BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 2.01 [11][ii], at 2-74 (1986)).
73. Id. at 178, 182, 359 S.E.2d at 284, 286.
74. Id. at 178-79, 359 S.E.2d at 284-85 ("[The Appellant] initially planned to organize the
enterprise as a limited partnership with himself as the general partner.... [But, upon advice, formed
a general partnership in which he] 'would be the managing general partner and do all the kinds of
things normally associated with a limited partnership.' ... [In fact, t]he partnership agreement
provide[d] that [the Appellant], as managing partner, has 'full charge of the management, conduct
and operation of the Partnership business in all respects."').
75. Id. at 181, 359 S.E.2d at 286 (citing Odom, 703 F.2d at 214-15; Sowards, supra note 72,
§ 2.01[11][ii], at 2-74).
76. Id. (quoting Tcherepnin, 389 U.S. at 336) (internal quotation marks omitted).
77. Majors v. S.C. Sec. Comm'n, 373 S.C. 153, 167, 644 S.E.2d 710, 718 (2007) (citing SEC
v. Unique Fin. Concepts, Inc., 196 F.3d 1195, 1201 (11th Cir. 1999)), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 441
(2007).
78. Id.
79. See id. at 164-68, 644 S.E.2d at 716-18.
80. Id. at 167-68, 644 S.E.2d at 718.
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SEARCHING FOR "SECURITY"

As the Majors decision demonstrates, South Carolina courts have woven
together a complex
scheme
1
81
.of federal interpretations of statutory terms by which
to apply SCUSA.
Originally passed in 1961, SCUSA implemented
recommendations of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws (NCCUSL) as promulgated in the Uniform Securities Act of 1956
(USA).82 The USA was designed, in part, to coordinate state and federal
83
securities laws and to implement national standards for securities regulation.
The USA sought, in essence, to lower transaction costs associated with national
securities offerings that were
required to comply with numerous inconsistent
84
state regulatory frameworks.
Nevertheless, some commentators consider SCUSA "complex and in some
respects obscure, ' 85 particularly because state courts have not formed many
independent interpretations of its provisions. In fact, South Carolina courts
generally do not independently analyze whether particular investment
instruments are securities. 86 Instead, South Carolina courts have traditionally
looked to federal judicial interpretations of the federal securities laws to inform
state judicial interpretations of similarly worded provisions. 87 Under SCUSA,
South Carolina's definition of a security was almost identical to definitions
contained in the federal securities laws.88 South Carolina courts' substantial

81. See id. at 162-67, 644 S.E.2d at 715-18; see also Garrett, 293 S.C. at 180-182, 359
S.E.2d at 285-86 (determining whether general partnership interests are securities); McGaha v.
Mosley, 283 S.C. 268, 273, 322 S.E.2d 461, 464 (Ct. App. 1984) (determining whether written
assignments of interests in profits under a franchise agreement constitute securities).
82. J. Parks Workman, The South Carolina Uniform SecuritiesAct of 2005: A Balancing Act
Under a New Blue Sky, 57 S.C. L. REV. 409, 413 (2006).
83. McWilliams, supra note 9, at 253.
84. See id. at 254 ("Uniformity benefits the states by permitting 'an interchangeability of
precedent and practice' among the states, while minimizing burdens on legitimate interstate
business." (citing LOUIS LOSS & EDWARD M. COWETT, BLUE SKY LAW 238 (1958))).
85. Id. at 243.
86. See, e.g., O'Quinn v. Beach Assocs., 272 S.C. 95, 105-06, 249 S.E.2d 734, 739 (1978)
(selling condominiums with rental management contracts); Garrett,293 S.C. at 180-82, 359 S.E.2d
at 285-86 (general partnership interests); McGaha, 283 S.C. at 273, 322 S.E.2d at 464 (written
assignments of interests in profits under franchise agreements).
87. E.g., Garrett,293 S.C. at 180, 359 S.E.2d at 285 (citing Bradley v. Hullander, 272 S.C. 6,
21, 249 S.E.2d 486, 494 (1978)) (comparing the definition of security in SCUSA and the Securities
Act of 1933).
88. Compare S.C. CODE ANN. § 35-1-20(12) (1987) (repealed 2006) ("'Security' means any
note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or
participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate
of subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit
for a security, certificate of interest or participation in an oil, gas or mining title or lease or in
payments out of production under such a title or lease or, in general, any interest or instrument
commonly known as a 'security', or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or
interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any
of the foregoing. 'Security' does not include any insurance or endowment policy or annuity contract
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borrowing from federal interpretations of security, at least originally, is likely
attributable to efforts to establish uniformity as well as to the substantially
greater amount
of judicial and academic gloss upon the similarly worded federal
89
statutes.
Regardless of the goal, South Carolina's systematic adoption of federal
interpretations of statutory terms is problematic. Various federal circuits have
taken different approaches in their own interpretations of the federal definition of
a security. 91 Although the United States Supreme Court has outlined the broad
parameters of federal securities law, the Court has not resolved several
significant, though nuanced, differences among the federal circuits.92 These
differences have become more pronounced over time.93 In addition, each circuit
has not addressed every issue. 94 For all practical purposes, each federal
95
jurisdiction has developed its own understanding of what constitutes a security.
Accordingly, South Carolina's tradition of looking to federal law for
guidance has resulted in the adoption of pieces of interpretations from numerous
federal jurisdictions and enabled a verdict driven selection process for lower
9
courts.
Attempts to predict the manner in which South Carolina courts will

under which an insurance company promises to pay money either in a lump sum or periodically for
life or for some other specified period."), with 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2006) ("The term 'security'
means any note, stock, treasury stock, security future, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness,
certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate,
preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust
certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas or other
mineral rights.... or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a 'security', or any
certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee
of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing."), and 15 U.S.C.
§ 78c(a)(10) (2006) ("The term 'security' means any note, stock, treasury stock, security future,
bond, debenture, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement or in any oil,
gas, or other mineral royalty or lease, any collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or
subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit
for a security,... or in general, any instrument commonly known as a 'security'; or any certificate
of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, or warrant or right to
subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing; but shall not include currency or any note, draft, bill
of exchange, or banker's acceptance which has a maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding
nine months, exclusive of days of grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity of which is likewise
limited.").
89. McWilliams, supra note 9, at 245.
90. See generally id. at 245-46 (describing potential issues regarding borrowing).
91. See 2 Loss ET AL., supra note 7, at 856-58, 858 n.6 (describing the term's broad
parameters and numerous attempts at interpreting it).
92. Id. at 857-58.
93. See, e.g., Long v. Shultz Cattle Co., 881 F.2d 129, 140-41, 140 n.11 (5th Cir. 1989)
(discussing the circuit split concerning when a "common enterprise" exists).
94. See 2 LOSS ET AL., supra note 7, at 855-1143 (surveying interpretations of security).
95. See id. at 856-58, 858 n.6 (attributing variety in interpretations to policy dimension).
96. See, e.g., Majors v. S.C. Sec. Comm'n, 373 S.C. 153, 162-67, 644 S.E.2d 710, 715-18
(2007) (adopting interpretations of the elements of a federal test from numerous jurisdictions), cert.
denied, 128 S.Ct. 441 (2007); Biales v. Young, 315 S.C. 166, 169-70, 432 S.E.2d 482, 484-85
(1993) (applying a federal test to interpret seller under the state statute).
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apply South Carolina's securities law are marked by uncertainty. 97 Most
importantly, however, the purposes underlying each federal interpretation have
encroached upon the effectuation of South Carolina's regulatory goals. 98
Federal and state securities laws reflect fundamentally different priorities.99
The federal regulatory regime focuses on disclosure requirements to create a
transparent environment of reliable information in the national market. 1°° State
securities statutes are designed to provide states with opportunities to tailor state
regulations to state interests and to appropriately supplement federal
regulations. 10 1 For example, state regulatory frameworks attempt to protect
individual investors by prohibiting the offering of unsound securities through
2
merit review10 except where preempted by federal law. 103
The two regulatory approaches may employ similar methods to achieve their
ends, but the underlying aims remain distinct. 1° 4 The adoption of a federal
court's reasoning in lieu of an independent analysis of state goals, therefore,
risks defeating the goals of state regulation. 10 5 Once this borrowing becomes
judicially formalized, the federal rationale for regulation
S 106 becomes the state
rationale for regulation, regardless of statutory intent.
The existence of
numerous federal jurisdictions-each with distinctive rationales underlying its
analysis-further convolutes the manner in which courts may apply state
regulations.
A.

Interpreting the South Carolina Uniform Securities Act

The South Carolina Supreme Court first announced that it would look to
federal cases interpreting federal securities statutes for guidance in interpreting
corresponding sections of SCUSA in Bradley v. Hullander.107 The Bradley court
reasoned that South Carolina courts should look for guidance to cases

97. See, e.g., Allen v. Columbia Fin. Mgmt., Ltd., 297 S.C. 481, 486-88, 377 S.E.2d 352,
355-57 (Ct. App. 1988) (adopting federal precedent to interpret the term seller while independently
construing the term employee).
98. See, e.g. McWilliams, supra note 9, at 245 (arguing that inappropriate borrowing can
undermine state values and interests).
99. Id. at 248.
100. Id. at 248-49.
101. See JOEL SELIGMAN, TiE NEW UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT xvii-xix (2003) (explaining
the benefits of the Uniform Securities Act of 2002).
102. McWilliams, supra note 9, at 249-50.
103. SELIGMAN, supra note 101, at xxi ("[The Uniform Securities Act of 1956 and the
Revised Uniform Securities Act of 1985] have been preempted in part by the National Securities
Markets Improvement Act of 1996 and the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998.").
104. McWilliams, supra note 9, at 251.
105. See id. at 245 ("[P]ursuit of the goals of convenience and uniformity should not, without
analysis, subsume other, 'exclusive' state values and interests. If employed mechanically as a rule
of construction, wholesale borrowing can become a substitute for analysis.").
106. Id.
107. 272 S.C. 6, 249 S.E.2d 486 (1978).
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interpreting federal securities statutes where the state act adopted provisions
"almost verbatim" to those in the federal statute. 10 8 Bradley provides the
foundation for judicial interpretation of the state securities statute by analogy to
federal statutes. 1°9 South Carolina courts110have extended the Bradley court's
approach to several provisions of SCUSA.
In Carver v. Blanford, the South Carolina Supreme Court relied on
Bradley in examining two contemporary United States Supreme Court cases to
determine whether stock in a closely held corporation is a security.112 The
Carvercourt found that the federal cases announced a "bright line" rule: "sales
of stock in close corporations fall within the federal securities laws if the
instruments are labeled stock, and have the usual characteristics of stock."113 In a
brief decision, the South Carolina Supreme Court adopted the federal rule and
concluded that the case "clearly falls" under the protection of SCUSA. 114 The
court 15did not analyze the state statute or otherwise examine South Carolina
1
law.
This trend continued in cases that required South Carolina courts to construe
SCUSA in the absence of directly relevant South Carolina authority. 116 In fact,
few cases after Bradley117
have drawn any distinction between the federal and state
definitions of a security.

108. Id. at 21,249 S.E.2d at 494.
109. See Majors v. S.C. Sec. Comm'n, 373 S.C. 153, 163, 644 S.E.2d 710, 715 (2007) (citing
Garrett v. Snedigar, 293 S.C. 176, 180, 359 S.E.2d 283, 285 (Ct. App. 1987), overruled on other
grounds by Olson v. Faculty House of Carolina, Inc., 354 S.C. 161, 168, 580 S.E.2d 440, 444
(2003)), cert. denied, 128 S.Ct. 441 (2007); Biales v. Young, 315 S.C. 166, 169, 432 S.E.2d 482,
484 (1993) (citing Bradley, 272 S.C. at 21, 249 S.E.2d at 494); Carver v. Blanford, 288 S.C. 309,
310, 342 S.E.2d 406, 407 (1986) (citing Bradley, 272 S.C. at 21, 249 S.E.2d at 494); Allen v.
Columbia Fin. Mgmt., Ltd., 297 S.C. 481, 486-87, 377 S.E.2d 352, 355-56 (Ct. App. 1988) (citing
Carver, 288 S.C. at 310, 342 S.E.2d at 407); Garrett, 293 S.C. at 180, 359 S.E.2d at 285 (citing
Bradley, 272 S.C. at 21, 249 S.E.2d at 494); McGaha v. Mosley, 283 S.C. 268, 273, 322 S.E.2d 461,
464 (Ct. App. 1984) (citing Bradley, 272 S.C. at 21, 249 S.E.2d at 494).
110. E.g., Carver, 288 S.C. at 310, 342 S.E.2d at 407 (using the approach to determine if stock
in a close corporation is a security); McGaha, 283 S.C. at 273, 322 S.E.2d at 464 (extending the
approach to the definition of security).
111. 288 S.C. 309, 342 S.E.2d 406 (1986).
112. Carver, 288 S.C. at 310, 342 S.E.2d at 407.
113. Id. (citing Gould v. Ruefenacht, 471 U.S. 701, 704 (1985); Landreth Timber Co. v.
Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 686 (1985)).
114. Id.
115. See id.
116. See Biales v. Young, 315 S.C. 166, 169, 432 S.E.2d 482, 484 (1993); Garrett v. Snedigar,
293 S.C. 176, 180, 359 S.E.2d 283, 285 (Ct. App. 1987) overruled on other grounds by Olson v.
Faculty House of Carolina, Inc., 354 S.C. 161, 168, 580 S.E.2d 440,444 (2003).
117. But see Atlanta Skin & Cancer Clinic, P.C. v. Hallmark Gen. Partners, Inc., 320 S.C. 113,
119, 463 S.E.2d 600, 603-04 (1995) (citing Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of
Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994)) (drawing a distinction between the state and federal
securities statutes regarding an implied aiding and abetting cause of action); Crim v. E.F. Hutton,
Inc., 298 S.C. 448, 450, 381 S.E.2d 492, 493 (1989) (drawing a distinction between the state and
federal securities statutes regarding bona fide pledges or loans as securities).
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In Allen v. Columbia FinancialManagement, Ltd.,118 the South Carolina
Court of Appeals observed that South Carolina courts had not previously
addressed the amount of participation in a sale necessary to make one a "seller"
under SCUSA. 1 The Allen court applied both the principle and reasoning of the
United States Supreme Court in Pinter v. Dahl,120 concluding that the appellants
were not primarily liable as sellers under SCUSA because "being a substantial
factor in causing the sale of unregistered securities is not sufficient" to be a seller
under SCUSA.
Again, the court did not analyze any provision of South
Carolina law to construe the definition of seller under the state statute. 122
The South Carolina Supreme Court subsequently reaffirmed the court of
appeals's adoption of the Pinter test and the federal legislative purposes on
which the test is based. 123 In Biales v. Young, 124 the court determined that an
escrow agent employed in the sale of property secured in part by a 2% equity
participation in a development project was not a seller under SCUSA because he
did not "persuade or urge" the appellant to purchase the securities. 125 The court
observed that the Pinter test is "consistent" with SCUSA and "satisfies the
legislative purpose of assuring
truth in the sales of securities and a predicable
126
application of liability."
B. Defining "Investment Contract"
Some commentators have argued that the wholesale adoption of federal
interpretations of statutory terms by states could be appropriate in order to
sustain complete uniformity between state• and federal
• 127 regulatory frameworks as
long as states maintain uniformity of interpretation.
However, states have not
maintained complete uniformity. 128 For example, some states have chosen to
advance different interests through
varying interpretations of statutory terms,
' 129
such as "investment contract."

118. 297 S.C. 481, 377 S.E.2d 352 (Ct. App. 1988).
119. Id. at 486, 377 S.E.2d at 355 (citing McCall v. Finley, 294 S.C. 1, 8, 362 S.E.2d 26, 30
(Ct. App. 1987)).
120. Id. at 487, 377 S.E.2d at 356 (citing Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 650 (1988)).
121. Id. (citing Pinter,486 U.S. at 650).
122. See id.
123. Biales v. Young, 315 S.C. 166, 169-70, 432 S.E.2d 482, 484-85 (1993) (citing Pinter,
486 U.S. at 650).
124. 315 S.C. 166,432 S.E.2d 482 (1993).
125. Id. at 170, 432 S.E.2d at 485.
126. Id.
127. See McWilliams, supra note 9, at 253-55 (citing LOSS & COWETT, supra note 84, at
230-38).
128. E.g., SELIGMAN, supra note 101, at xxiv ("The states are divided on the question of
whether variable insurance products should be excluded (and not subject to fraud enforcement) or
exempted (and subject to fraud enforcement).").
129. McWilliams, supra note 9, at 262 (citing Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681,
688 (1985)).
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Federal and state interpretations of the term "investment contract" begin
with the Howey test.13° In SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 131 the United States Supreme
Court established a test to determine whether investment instruments qualify as
investment contracts and are, therefore, subject to regulation. 132 The Supreme
Court intended that federal courts apply the test liberally in an effort to include
133
the novel creations of inventive-and sometimes unscrupulous-promoters.
Since Howern however, federal courts have interpreted the elements of the test
differently."
The Howey Court concluded that the offering of land sales contracts for
portions of a citrus grove, when coupled with the offering of service contracts for
the cultivation, marketing, and harvesting of the crops, constituted an offering of
investment contracts and, thus, securities. 135 In its analysis, the Court examined
the history of investment contracts under state blue sky laws predating the
federal statute and observed that the term "had been broadly construed by state
136
courts so as to afford the investing public a full measure of protection."
Accordingly, the Court incorporated into the federal securities laws a similarly
broad definition of investment contract. 137 The Howey Court also found that state
courts had applied the term "to a variety of situations where individuals were led
to invest money in a common enterprise with the expectation that they would
earn a profit solely through the efforts of the promoter or of some one other than
themselves.' ' 138 The Court held:
[A]n investment contract for purposes of the Securities Act means a
contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a
common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of
the promoter or a third party, it being immaterial whether the shares in
the enterprise are evidenced by formal certificates or139 by nominal
interests in the physical assets employed in the enterprise.
The Court explained that the definition "embodies a flexible rather than static
principle, one that is capable of adaptation to meet the countless and variable
schemes devised by those who seek the use of the money of others on the
promise of profits.""4

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

2 Loss ET AL., supra note 47, at 922-23.
328 U.S. 293 (1946).
Id. at 301.
See id. at 299.
See 2 Loss ET AL., supra note 7, at 927-1013.
Howey, 328 U.S. at 299-300.
Id. at 298.
See id. at 299.
Id. at 298 (citations omitted).
Id. at 298-99.
Id. at 299.
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The Howey test traditionally has four elements: (1) an investment of money,
(2) in a common enterprise, (3) that leads to an expectation of profits, (4) solely
from the efforts of others. 141 Some jurisdictions, however, recognize the third
and fourth requirements as a single element. 142 Regardless of the number of
elements, each has been interpreted differently in different jurisdictions. 14 Those
differences, at first nuanced, have become more pronounced over time. In
addition, the test itself has evolved. 144 Since Howey, the United States Supreme
Court has expanded "an investment of money" to include any "tangible and
definable consideration in return for an interest that have substantially the
characteristics of a security."' 145 The Supreme Court has also "significantly
amplified" the expectation of profits element. 146 Even more importantly, the
Court has observed that lower courts have relaxed the requirement that an
expectation of profits come solely from the efforts of others.
The Court has
held instead 14that
lower
courts
should
examine
the
"economic
realities
of the
' 8
transaction."
C. Approaching "Security" in South Carolina
The South Carolina Supreme Court first addressed the statutory meanings of
investment contract and security in O 'Quinn v. Beach Associates. In O'Quinn,
the court concluded that the sale of condominium units with an optional
provision for managerial services for those purchasers intending to place them
on the rental market did not constitute the offering of investment contracts as
long as the purchaser retained "ultimate control." 150 Although the O'Quinn court
did not cite the then recently decided case of Bradley v. Hullander,the court did
utilize federal precedent in reaching its decision. 151 The O'Quinn court observed
that other jurisdictions have generally held that investment arrangements in
which the investor's duties are "nominal and insignificant" or in which the

141.2 LOSS ET AL., supra note 7, at 927-28.
142. E.g., Teague v. Bakker, 35 F.3d 978, 986 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing Bailey v. J.W.K.
Properties, Inc., 904 F.2d 918, 920 (4th Cir. 1990)) (describing a three-element Howey test requiring
"an expectation of profits garnered 'solely' from the efforts of others").
143. See 2 LOSS ET AL., supra note 7, at 927-57 (surveying the varied interpretations of each
element).
144. Id. at 928.
145. Id. (quoting Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 560 (1979)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
146. Id. at 939 (citing United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975)).
147. Forman, 421 U.S. at 852 n.16 (citing SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., 474 F.2d 476, 482
(9th Cir. 1973)).
148. Id. at 851-52.
149. 272 S.C. 95, 249 S.E.2d 734 (1978).
150. Id. at 105-06, 249 S.E.2d at 739.
151. O'Quinn, 272 S.C. at 105-06, 249 S.E.2d at 739 (citing SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328
U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946); Fargo Partners v. Dain Corp., 540 F.2d 912, 914-15 (8th Cir. 1976)).
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investor "lacks any real control" may constitute investment contracts. 152 In
O'Quinn, the court concluded that the purchaser's lack of "substantial reliance
on the efforts of the seller or third parties for a return on153 the investment"
prevented the arrangement from being an investment contract.
In McGaha v. Mosley,154 the South Carolina Court of Appeals extended the
approach of Bradley, Carver, and Biales to the statutory construction of
security.155 The court of appeals held that the written assignment of an interest in
profits under a franchise agreement constituted a security under SCUSA.156 The
plaintiff, a part-time receptionist, purchased an interest in the net profits of her
failing company's franchise agreement with a manufacturer. 157 Shortly after her
investment, the company ceased doing business. 158 The defendant contended that
he could not have violated SCUSA because the assignment was not a security.159
The McGaha court observed that South Carolina courts had not previously
addressed the meaning of security but that the statutory definition was "taken
almost verbatim" from the federal securities statute. 16° Accordingly, the court
sought guidance from cases interpreting the federal statute. 161 The McGaha court
aligned South Carolina's interpretation of security with federal jurisprudence and
explicitly adopted the federal
•,,162 principle that securities laws "should be liberally
construed to protect investors.
As a result, the court concluded that a written
assignment constitutes a security when "on its face" it is a certificate of interest
or participation in a profit-sharing arrangement. 163
The South Carolina Court of Appeals again addressed the Howey test in
Garrett v. Snedigar,164 concluding that courts must examine the facts of each
case to determine whether a partnership agreement creates an investment
contract. 165 The court observed:

152. Id. (citing FargoPartners,540 F.2d at 914-15).
153. Id. at 106, 249 S.E.2d at 739 (quoting Fargo Partners,540 F.2d at 915).
154. 283 S.C. 268, 322 S.E.2d 461 (Ct. App. 1984).
155. McGaha, 283 S.C. at 273, 322 S.E.2d at 464; see Biales, 315 S.C. at 169, 432 S.E.2d at
484; Carver, 288 S.C. at 310, 342 S.E.2d at 407; Bradley v. Hullander, 272 S.C. 6, 21, 249 S.E.2d
486, 494 (1978).
156. McGaha, 283 S.C. at 273, 322 S.E.2d at 464.
157. Id. at 272, 322 S.E.2d at 463.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 272, 322 S.E.2d at 464.
160. Id. at 273, 322 S.E.2d at 464 (citing Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1)
(2006)).
161. Id. (citing Bradley v. Hullander, 272 S.C. 6, 21, 249 S.E.2d 486, 494 (1978)).
162. Id. (citing Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967)).
163. Id.
164. 293 S.C. 176, 359 S.E.2d 283 (Ct. App. 1987), overruled on other grounds by Olson v.
Faculty House of Carolina, Inc., 354 S.C. 161, 168, 580 S.E.2d 440, 444 (2003). For a full
discussion of Garrett,see supra Part II.C.
165. See Garrett,293 S.C. at 182, 359 S.E.2d at 286.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol60/iss5/8

16

Novak: Who's Guiding South Carolina's Securities Jurisprudence?: A Major
2009]

SECURITIES LAW

1091

In the leading recent case on this issue, the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals identified three considerations in deciding whether an interest
in a general partnership is a security: (1) [whether] an agreement among
the parties leaves so little power in the hands of the partner or venturer
that the arrangement in fact distributes power as would a limited
partnership; or (2) [whether] the partner or venturer is so inexperienced
and unknowledgeable in business affairs that he is incapable of
intelligently exercising his partnership or venture powers; or (3)
[whether] the partner or venturer is so dependent on some unique
entrepreneurial or managerial ability of the promoter or manager that he
cannot replace the manager of the enterprise or otherwise exercise
meaningful partnership or venture powers.
Although the Garrett court cited both federal and state authorities, like the
Bradley and McGaha courts6 7 it anchored its opinion almost entirely upon federal
interpretations of the term]n1
D. Federal CourtRecognition of South Carolina'sReliance
Like the South Carolina judiciary, federal courts within the Fourth Circuit
have long recognized South Carolina's reliance upon federal precedents to
interpret SCUSA. 16 In fact, in Kosnoski v. Bruce, 1 9 the Fourth Circuit even
construed a novel aspect of South Carolina law without certifying the issue to the
South Carolina Supreme Court. 17 The Fourth Circuit confidently assumed that
the South Carolina Supreme Court would adopt its interpretation 171
and,
consequently, followed its own precedent in construing South Carolina law.
The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina has also
recognized South Carolina's reliance upon federal precedent. In South Carolina
National Bank v. Darmstadter,172 the district court observed that an attempt to
apply the term security under South Carolina law "must necessarily deal with the
federal securities laws." 173 In Fairclothv. Jackie Fine Arts, Inc., 174 the district
court found that the two definitions are "virtually identical." 175 In Faircloth,the

166. Id. at 181, 359 S.E.2d at 286 (alterations in original) (quoting Williamson v. Tucker, 645
F.2d 404, 424 (5th Cir. 1981)).
167. See id. at 181, 359 S.E.2d at 285-86 (citing Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336
(1967); Odom v. Slavik, 703 F.2d 212, 215 (6th Cir. 1983); Williamson, 645 F.2d at 424).
168. See Kosnoski v. Bruce, 669 F.2d 944, 946 (4th Cir. 1982).
169. 669 F.2d 944 (4th Cir. 1982).
170. See id. at 946-47.
171. Id. at 946.
172. 622 F. Supp. 226 (D.S.C. 1985).
173. Id. at 229 (citing Bradley v. Hullander, 272 S.C. 6, 21, 249 S.E.2d 486,494 (1978)).
174. 682 F. Supp. 837 (D.S.C. 1988), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom
Faircloth v. Finesod, 938 F.2d 513, 519 (4th Cir. 1991).
175. Id. at 843.
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district court examined several South Carolina cases and concluded that the
subject
investment "was either a security under state and federal law or not at
17 6
all.

,

As these cases demonstrate, South Carolina's reliance on federal precedents
for guidance when interpreting state securities laws has evolved into a tradition
of deference. 177 Accordingly, predicting the manner in which securities laws will
be applied in South Carolina requires knowledge of the vast gloss on federal
securities jurisprudence. 178 This tradition also provides South Carolina courts the
opportunity to select the meaning of ambiguous statutory terms within the
securities statute, which are likely to 179
be outcome determinative, from myriad
federal interpretations of similar terms.
IV. A NEW

(NONFEDERAL) APPROACH

The South Carolina General Assembly enacted the SCUSA of 2005 to
implement the numerous changes to state securities laws promulgated by
NCCUSL in the Uniform Securities Act of 2002 (USA of 2002). 18 The USA of
2002 is the latest national effort to modernize state securities statutes in response
to new federal preemptive legislation, changes in technology, and the
increasingly interstate nature of securities transactions. 181 In large part, the USA
of 2002 is an effort to maximize the uniformity and effectiveness of state and
federal regulatory standards. 182
In pursuit of these goals, the SCUSA of 2005 redefines security.183 The
revised definition begins similarly to the definition under SCUSA, which is

176. Id.
177. See cases cited supra note 6.
178. Compare Majors v. S.C. Sec. Comm'n, 373 S.C. 153, 162-67, 644 S.E.2d 710, 715-18
(2007) (citing numerous federal precedents to apply the term investment contract), with 2 LOSS ET
AL., supra note 7, at 927-1013 (providing an extensive survey of federal interpretations of the term
investment contract).
179. See generally McWilliams, supra note 9, at 245 (examining the potential impact of
borrowing federal courts' construction of similarly worded statutes).
180. Workman, supra note 82, at 414 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 35-1-101 to -703 (Supp.
2008) (replacing S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 35-1-10 to -1590 (1987))).
181. SELIGMAN, supra note 101, at xxi.
182. Id. at xxii-xxiii.
183. Compare S.C. CODE ANN. § 35-1-102(29) (Supp. 2008) ("'Security' means any note;
stock; treasury stock; security future; bond; debenture; evidence of indebtedness; certificate of
interest or participation in a profit-sharing agreement; collateral trust certificate; preorganization
certificate or subscription; transferable share; investment contract; voting trust certificate; certificate
of deposit for a security; fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights; put, call,
straddle, option, or privilege on a security, certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities,
including an interest therein or based on the value thereof; put, call, straddle, option, or privilege
entered into on a national securities exchange relating to foreign currency; or, in general, an interest
or instrument commonly known as a 'security'; or a certificate of interest or participation in,
temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or
purchase, any of the foregoing. The term: (A) includes both a certificated and an uncertificated
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constructed "almost verbatim" from the definition in the Federal Securities Act
of 1933184 and includes investment contract. 185 The revised definition substitutes
the broader "fractional undivided interests in oil, gas, or other mineral rights" for
the prior law's use of "certificate of interest or participation in an oil, gas or
mining title or lease or in payments out of production under such a title or
lease. ' 186 The SCUSA of 2005 also incorporates into the revised definition any
interest in, or any interest whose value is based upon, securities futures, puts,
calls, straddles, options, privileges on securities, certificates of deposit, and
groups or indexes of securities, as well as foreign currency instruments entered
into on a national securities exchange. 187 The new definition also includes both
"certificated" and "uncertificated" securities, in order to clearly incorporate

security; (B) does not include an insurance or endowment policy or annuity contract under which an
insurance company promises to pay a sum of money either in a lump sum or periodically for life or
other specified period; (C) does not include an interest in a contributory or noncontributory pension
or welfare plan subject to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974; (D) includes an
investment in a common enterprise with the expectation of profits to be derived primarily from the
efforts of a person other than the investor and a 'common enterprise' means an enterprise in which
the fortunes of the investor are interwoven with those of either the person offering the investment, a
third party, or other investors; and (E) 'Investment contract' may include, among other contracts, an
interest in a limited partnership and a limited liability company and shall include an investment in a
viatical settlement or similar agreement."), with S.C. CODE ANN. § 35-1-20(12) (1987) (repealed
2006) ("'Security' means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness,
certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate,
preorganization certificate of subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust
certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, certificate of interest or participation in an oil, gas or
mining title or lease or in payments out of production under such a title or lease or, in general, any
interest or instrument commonly known as a 'security', or any certificate of interest or participation
in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to
or purchase, any of the foregoing. 'Security' does not include any insurance or endowment policy or
annuity contract under which an insurance company promises to pay money either in a lump sum or
periodically for life or for some other specified period.").
184. Bradley v. Hullander, 272 S.C. 6, 21, 249 S.E.2d 486, 494 (1978).
185. Compare statutes cited supra note 183, with 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2006) ("The term
'security' means any note, stock, treasury stock, security future, bond, debenture, evidence of
indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust
certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract,
voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas,
or other mineral rights, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security, certificate of
deposit, or group or index of securities (including any interest therein or based on the value thereof),
or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a national securities exchange relating
to foreign currency, or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a 'security', or
any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for,
guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing."). The
Commodities Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-365
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 11, 12, & 15 U.S.C.), amended § 2(a)(1) of the
Securities Act of 1933 to address security futures and securities puts, calls, straddles, options, and
privileges, see id. § 208, 114 Stat. at 2763A-435 to 2763A-436.
186. See supra note 183.
187. S.C. CODE ANN. § 35-1-102(29) (Supp. 2008).

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

19

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 60, Iss. 5 [2020], Art. 8
1094

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 60: 1075

offerings that are not evidenced by a writing, 188 and explicitly excludes interests
in contributory or noncontributory pension or welfare plans that are subject to
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974.189
Unlike earlier uniform acts, USA of 2002 invites states to incorporate
nonfederal material into the definition. 190 For example, USA of 2002 provides
optional language for states that decide to exclude variable annuities from the
definition of security. 191 The General Assembly chose not to adopt the optional
language and thus appears to have intended that variable annuities be
incorporated into the state securities regime even though the statute remains
silent on the issue. 192
The General Assembly chose to accept several provisions
intended to 193
clarify
•
the types of instruments that the statute regulates as investment contracts. The
definition of security adopted pursuant to the SCUSA of 2005 supplements the
previous definition, in part, by codifying the Howey test and by defining the term
common enterprise to include both horizontal commonality and a restricted form
194
of vertical commonality resulting from profit sharing between two individuals.
In addition, the new statute provides that investment contract may include
interests in limited partnerships and limited liability companies and does include
investments in viatical settlements. 195 By incorporating these provisions into the
new statute, the General Assembly has adopted a policy of nonuniformity in
certain aspects of the meaning of investment contract. 196 These variations from
federal law conflict with South Carolina's longstanding judicial principle of
deference to federal interpretations of terms within the state statute.
The most dramatic departure may be the codification of the Howey test. In
contrast to the version of the Howey test adopted in Majors,198 the new South
Carolina statute states that a "security"
includes an investment in a common enterprise with the expectation of
profits to be derived primarily from the efforts of a person other than

188. Id. § 35-1-102 official cmt. 28.
189. Id. § 35-1-102(29).
190. SELIGMAN, supra note 101, at xxiii.
191. Id. at xvii.
192. See § 35-1-102(29)(B); cf. id. § 35-1-102 official cmt. 28 ("The Drafting Committee
recognized that the decision whether to exclude variable annuities from the definition of security
will be made on a state-by-state basis. Those states which intend to exclude variable products from
the definition of security should add the words 'or variable' to Section 102(29)(B) so that it will
read: (B) The term does not include an insurance or endowment policy or annuity contract under
which an insurance company promises to pay a fixed or variable sum of money either in a lump sum
or periodically for life or other specified period.").
193. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 35-1-102(29)(C)-(E); SELIGMAN, supra note 101, at 27-28.
194. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 35-1-102 official cmt. 28.
195. Id. § 35-1-102(29)(E).
196. See id. § 35-1-102(29)(C)-(E); id. § 35-1-102 official cmt. 28.
197. Id. § 35-1-102(29)(D) & official cmt. 28.
198. See Majors v. S.C. Sec. Comm'n, 373 S.C. 153, 163, 644 S.E.2d 710,716 (2007).
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the investor and a "common enterprise" means an enterprise in which
the fortunes of the investor are interwoven with those of either
the
199
person offering the investment, a third party, or other investors.
While the South Carolina Supreme Court gleaned its interpretation of the
2
Howey test in Majors from myriad federal interpretations of each element, 00
South Carolina courts must now interpret the Howey test as prescribed by the
South Carolina statute. 201 Although many of the terms are identical, differences
do exist. 20 2 In addition, the Majors court observed that courts have "relaxed" the
"efforts of others" element and adopted a federal test focused on the promoter's
efforts. 20 3 The SCUSA of 2005, by contrast, provides the requirement that "the
expectation of profits.., be derived primarily from the efforts of a person other
than the investor." 2° 4 Accordingly, the SCUSA of 2005 preempts the federal test
adopted in Majors.
The statutory definition for common enterprise presents similar conflict.20 5
In Majors, the South Carolina Supreme Court adopted the "more restrictive form
of vertical commonality" after consulting the Official Comments to the SCUSA
2 6
of 2005 and discerning a preference for this common enterprise test. 0
According to the Official Comments to SCUSA:
The courts have divided over the interpretation of the "common
enterprise" element of an investment contract. The courts generally
recognize that "horizontal" commonality (for example, the pooling of an
investment by two or more investors) is a common enterprise. A small
minority of the federal circuits will also find a common enterprise in a
,vertical" relationship when a single investor is dependent upon the
expertise of a single commodities broker. Since two or more persons do

199. S.C. CODE ANN. § 35-1-102(29)(D) (emphasis added).
200. See Majors, 373 S.C. at 163-67, 644 S.E.2d at 716-18; see also 2 LOSS ET AL., supra
note 7, at 927-1013 (surveying the numerous federal interpretations of the term investment
contract).
201. See S.C. CODE ANN.§ 35-1-102(29)(D) & official cmt. 28; see also Purvis v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 304 S.C. 283, 288, 403 S.E.2d 662, 665 (Ct. App. 1991) ("The General
Assembly has the power to prescribe legal definitions by statute, and such definitions are binding
upon courts and should prevail." (citing Brown v. Martin, 203 S.C. 84, 88, 26 S.E.2d 317, 318
(1943))).
202. Compare S.C. CODE ANN. § 35-1-102(29)(D) ("Security... includes an investment in a
common enterprise with the expectation of profits to be derived primarily from the efforts of a
person other than the investor ....), with Majors, 373 S.C. at 163, 644 S.E.2d at 716 ("[A]n
investment contract exists where there has been (i) an investment of money, (ii) in a common
enterprise, (iii) with an expectation of profits garnered solely from the efforts of others.").
203. Majors, 373 S.C. at 167, 644 S.E.2d at 717 (citing Garrett v. Snedigar, 293 S.C. 176, 180,
359 S.E.2d 283, 285 (Ct. App. 1987).
204. S.C. CODE ANN. § 35-1-102(29)(D).
205. See id.
206. Majors, 373 S.C. at 165-66, 644 S.E.2d at 717 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 35-1-102
official cmt. 28).
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not share in the profitability of an undertaking, it is difficult to argue
that there is a common enterprise. Section 102(29)(D) follows a
significantly larger number of federal circuits and adopts a more
restrictive form of vertical commonality that occurs only when there is
profit sharing between two persons even 20if,
7 for example, one is a
conventional investor and one is a promoter.
Although the General Assembly has concluded that profit sharing between
any two persons is sufficient to establish a common enterprise, 20 8 South Carolina
courts will have to determine the manner in which to apply those concepts.
Nevertheless, South Carolina has extricated itself from the ongoing debate
among the federal circuits regarding the construction of a common enterprise by
defining the term statutorily.
The SCUSA of 2005 also provides that the definition of a security includes,
in part, the term investment contract as defined in the statute. 20 9 The statute,
however, does not limit the definition of investment contract to the language in
the statute. 210 More specifically, the statute explains that investment contract may
include interests in limited partnerships and limited liability companies and does
include interests in viatical settlements and similar agreements. The NCCUSL
designed these optional
•• 212 provisions to enable states to tailor the uniform statute to
state court decisions. The provision recognizing that investment contracts may
include interests in limited partnerships and limited liability companies is
consistent with numerous state and federal securities laws. 213 The provision
incorporating interests in viatical settlements and other similar
agreements into
2 14
the meaning of investment contract contradicts federal law.
A viatical settlement is "[a] transaction in which a terminally or chronically
ill person sells the benefits of a life-insurance policy to a third party in return for
215
a lump-sum cash payment equal to a percentage of the policy's face value.,
Viatical settlement providers generally aggregate policies from individual
patients to sell fractionalized interests in the group of policies. 216 An investor can
purchase an interest in a viatical settlement typically at a 20% to 40% discount,

207. S.C. CODE ANN. § 35-1-102 official cmt. 28.
208. See id. § 35-1-102(29)(D).
209. Id. § 35-1-102(29).
210. See id. § 35-1-102(29)(E).
211. Id.
212. See id. § 35-1-102 official cmt. 28; see also SELIGMAN, supra note 101, at xxiii
(explaining that in certain instances the uniform act defers to local practice).
213. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 35-1-102 official cmt. 28 (citing 2 LOSS, ET. AL., supra note 7, at
1028-31).
214. Id. (citing SEC v. Life Partners, Inc., 87 F.3d 536, 548 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).
215. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1405 (8th ed. 2004).

216. Brian Coner Levin, Killing Life Partners: Why Viatical Settlements are "Securities" in
Light of SEC v. Mutual Benefits Corporation and Other Recent Cases that Explicitly Reject SEC v.
Life Partners, 6 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 71, 72 (2006) (citing SEC v. Mutual Benefits Corp., 323 F. Supp.
2d 1337, 1338 (S.D. Fla. 2004)).
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depending upon the life expectancy of the insured. 217 The gain from such an
investment depends upon the term of the investment and is realized upon the
death of the insured.
The investor's profit is the difference between the
purchase price, including transaction costs and premiums paid, and the benefit
collected upon death. 219 This type of transaction became popular in the 1980s as
a result of the increasing number of individuals
who incurred substantial medical
220
bills for treatment of the AIDS virus.
The General Assembly's inclusion of interests in viatical settlements within
the statutory definition of security contradicts the federal holding of SEC v. Life
Partners,Inc. 2 In fact, the South Carolina Reporter's Official Comments to the
SCUSA of 2005 explicitly reject that case. 222 In Life Partners,the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia concluded that fractional interests
in viatical settlements are not investment contracts because investment profits
did not "flow predominantly from the efforts of others" and "investor[s] did not
look to the promoter (or another party) to provide significant post-purchase
efforts. ,,223 The court reasoned that there is no "venture" in owning "an insurance
contract 22
from
which one's profit depends entirely upon the mortality of the
4
insured."
The new statute, in effect, provides an open-ended foundation for fresh
judicial interpretation of South Carolina's version of the Howey test and the term
investment contract. In general, a well-developed precedent remains: South
Carolina courts look to federal precedents for guidance in interpreting225South
Carolina Code provisions similar to those in federal securities statutes.
This
precedent, however, no longer applies to the Howey test. 226 Interestingly, the
precedent may apply to judicial interpretations of the term investment
contract. 227
Rejection of a federal precedent, like the codification of the Howey test and
the incorporation of restrictive vertical commonality into South Carolina's
securities jurisprudence, contravenes the longstanding judicial tradition of

217. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1405 (8th ed. 2004).
218. Levin, supra note 216 (citing Life Partners,87 F.3d at 548).
219. Id. (citing Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 537).
220. Id.
221. Compare S.C. CODE ANN. § 35-1-102(29)(E) (Supp. 2008) 87 F.3d 536 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
("'Investment contract' may include, among other contracts, an interest in a limited partnership and
a limited liability company and shall include an investment in a viatical settlement or similar
agreement."), with Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 548 (concluding that viatical settlements are not
securities). But see SEC v. Mut. Benefits Corp., 408 F.3d 737, 743 (11th Cir. 2005) (rejecting the
Life Partners test); Wuliger v. Anstaett, 363 F. Supp. 2d 917, 922 (N.D. Ohio 2005) (holding that
viatical settlements are securities under Ohio law).
222. S.C. CODE ANN. § 35-1-102 S.C. Reporter's cmt. 29.
223. Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 548.
224. Id.
225. See supra Part Il1.
226. See supra notes 197-204 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 209-14 and accompanying text.
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deference to federal interpretations when construing similarly worded state
securities provisions. Nevertheless, the state legislature's choices regarding the
meaning of investment contract within the definition of security under the
SCUSA of 2005 do not foreclose South Carolina courts from seeking guidance
from federal precedents regarding the construction of the term security or even
the term investment contract.
South Carolina courts may continue to follow the longstanding interpretive
approach of seeking guidance from federal court interpretations of investment
contract because the term remains within the definition of security, independent
of the codified Howey test.22 8 In fact, South Carolina courts may employ either
South Carolina's version of the Howey test or the federally-informed
interpretation of South Carolina's version of the term investment contract, which
now includes interests in limited partnerships, limited liability companies, and
viatical settlements. The General Assembly's adoption of a more restrictive form
of vertical commonality from several federal approaches also suggests that South
Carolina courts may embrace a particular federal approach when the federal
circuits differ on an aspect of securities jurisprudence.
V.

CONCLUSION

The South Carolina Supreme Court's considered analysis of the Howey test
in Majors v. South CarolinaSecurities Commission prospectively referenced the
statute that instantly preempted the test's adoption. In doing so, the supreme
court distanced South Carolina's securities jurisprudence from the strong
tradition of seeking guidance from federal courts to apply provisions of the state
securities statute. Although South Carolina courts may continue to seek guidance
from federal precedents, the Majors court signaled that the enactment of the
SCUSA of 2005 has provided23South
Carolina with an opportunity to reapproach
0
South Carolina securities law.
As this Comment has explained, federal courts have constructed varying
interpretations of the Howey test,231 but South Carolina's statutory version of the
Howey test is unencumbered. The enactment of the SCUSA of 2005 means that
South Carolina courts no longer have to look to federal courts for guidance
regarding whether a particular investment instrument constitutes an investment
contract, and thus a security under South Carolina law. Instead, South Carolina
courts can now look to South Carolina's statutory version of the Howey test.
South Carolina courts should continue this new approach when interpreting other
provisions of SCUSA, particularly those that incorporate nonfederal material.

228.
229.
230.
231.

See S.C. CODE ANN. § 35-1-102(29)(E).
See S.C. CODE ANN. § 35-1-102 official cmt. 28.
See supra Part II.
See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
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Absent federal influence, South Carolina's jurisprudence provides two
principles to inform future judicial construction of investment contract. In Biales
v. Young,23 2 the South Carolina Supreme Court found a "legislative purpose of
assuring truth in the sales of securities and a predicable application of
liability. '233 In McGaha v. Mosely,234 the South Carolina Court of Appeals held
that the definition
of security "should be liberally construed to protect
235
investors."
The South Carolina Supreme Court should continue to analyze and apply the
new securities statute to effect the intentions of the General Assembly. In so
doing, South Carolina courts can establish a coherent and independent body of
state securities jurisprudence that advances the interests of those the statute is
intended to protect-the people of South Carolina.
JustinP. Novak

232.
233.
234.
235.

315 S.C. 166,432 S.E.2d 482 (1993).
Id. at 170, 432 S.E.2d at 485.
283 S.C. 268, 322 S.E.2d 461 (Ct. App. 1984).
Id. at 273, 322 S.E.2d at 464 (citing Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 332 (1967)).
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